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THE TYRRELL WILLIAMS MEMORIAL
LECTURE
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture was established in 1948 by the
family and friends of Tyrrell Williams, a distinguished member of the
faculty of the Washington University School of Law from 1913 to 1946.
Since its inception, the Lectureship has provided a forum for the discussion of
significant and often controversial issues currently before the legal commu-
nity. Former Tyrrell Williams Lecturers include some of the nation's fore-
most legal scholars, judges, public servants, and practicing attorneys.
Geoffrey C Hazard, Jr., Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School and
the Executive Director of the American Law Institute, delivered the 1992
Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture on the Campus of Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis, Missouri on February 19, 1992.
DOING THE RIGHT THING
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.
A lawyer representing a client should try to "do the right thing."
Stated in simplest terms, this is the ideal that inspires the recurrent call
for lawyers to be more ethical. In the most recent decade, the call has
been expressed in terms of "professionalism." In earlier years, the call
was expressed as a demand that lawyers dedicate themselves to "serving
the public interest" and in Victorian times it was expressed in terms of
the "honor of the legal profession." However expressed, the quest is for
greater virtue on the part of lawyers, both individually and as a
profession.
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The call for greater professional virtue in the legal profession evokes
various reactions. Among the public at large, the reaction is one of cyni-
cism, particularly today when the legal profession's public standing is
very low, if perhaps not at an all time low. Among members of the legal
profession itself, the reaction runs the gamut, from a cynicism equal to or
exceeding that of the general public, to frustrated pleas that the profes-
sion's responsibilities are misunderstood, to bombastic proclamations
that there are only a few bad actors among the noble guardians of consti-
tutional liberties. Law students often react with anxious uncertainty to
criticisms of lawyer ethics. They do not know and cannot know what to
believe about the ethical condition of the professional life which they
have not yet entered, but to which, provisionally at least, they have com-
mitted themselves.
At one level, it is easy to describe the ethical standards observed by
many lawyers. Quite bluntly, they are terrible. On the other hand, the
ethical standards observed by many lawyers are excellent, particularly
considering the very difficult and delicate ethical problems with which
they must deal. The problem of "bad actors" in the profession is, in my
opinion, primarily the weakness of institutions' ability to secure compli-
ance with the profession's official standards. For example, the discipli-
nary machinery in many jurisdictions has simply been overwhelmed with
grievances that cannot be adequately investigated.
However, the focus of the present analysis is not on bad lawyers, but
on good lawyers. The central question is whether the nature of legal
practice itself, even when conducted with faithful adherence to official
standards, is somehow inherently evil. Much criticism of lawyers' ethics
is pitched at this level. The essence of this criticism is that lawyers en-
gage, as a vocation, in practices that no moral person would undertake in
any circumstance.
Criticism at this level seems to proceed from a metaethical conception
that is widely held, at least in this country. In non-technical terms, a
metaethical conception is a conception of what ethics is all about. The
framework of common assumption to which I refer includes ethics in the
American legal profession and, more broadly, ethics in the professions
generally, including callings such as medicine, teaching, journalism and
business management. Beyond this, the framework of common assump-
tion includes ethics in ordinary life-conceptions of doing the right thing
in the life of the family, the neighborhood, the workplace, consumer
transactions, and citizenship.
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Within this framework of assumption, various premises are established
about what is involved in "doing the right thing" in ordinary life. These
commonly held premises are the basis on which comparison is made with
professional ethics, including legal ethics. By a series of small and often
unnoticed steps, therefore, the question of lawyers' ethics-and whether
lawyers can ever do the right thing-is compared with the ethics of peo-
ple in ordinary life. In this comparison lawyers' ethics usually come out
poorly. Lawyers appear partisan rather than disinterested, guileful
rather than open, grasping rather than generous, and duplicitous rather
than truthful. The conclusion follows that lawyers do things as a matter
of course-indeed do them as the essence of their vocation-that no
right-thinking ordinary person would do under any circumstance.
This conclusion is often put in question form: Can one be a good law-
yer and still be a good person?
Stating the conclusion in this manner begs an important underlying
question, which concerns the definition of a "good person" in compari-
son with a "good lawyer." I suggest that the problem lies not with the
lawyer's vocation as such, but with the terms of the metaethic of conven-
tionally professed American morality. Simply, that metaethic is simplis-
tic, utterly unrealistic and predicated upon misconceptions about ethical
choice. Implicit in the comparison in which the lawyer looks bad is an
idealized ordinary person who does not exist. This idealized person has
no personal history and therefore acts in problematic situations without
constraining commitments to others; she confronts stipulated facts that
are perfectly comprehensible at the point of fateful decision; her ethical
repertoire is clearly apparent to her and she is readily able to determine
the relative priority of her values in whatever circumstances may be
presented; and her ethical choices are never subject to being second-
guessed.
Such people exist only in the minds of some metaethicists, although by
no means all of them. The comparison that is invited is not between a
good "person" and a good "lawyer," but between an imaginary good
person and a real lawyer, good or otherwise. Such a comparison is inevi-
tably invidious to lawyers, even relatively good ones. The imaginary
good person is essentially an angel; no one's ethics compare well with
those of an angel.
A sober consideration of the ethics of a good lawyer should begin with
a metaethic that contemplates the real world. Unlike angels, people in
the real world have personal histories which, among other things, deter-
1992]
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mine their positions in life at any moment of ethical choice. Having a
position in life limits one's options in taking action, and therefore one's
ethical options. People in the real world operate in a cat's cradle of com-
mitments to others. Having commitments to others makes one a parti-
san, whether willingly or otherwise. People in the real world have to deal
with fragmentary and often contradictory information that arrives dis-
jointed. Having fragmentary information means that ethical choices are
often based on factual assumptions that turn out to be false. This uncer-
tainty often requires decisions modulated by concern that one should, as
Oliver Cromwell said, "think it possible that you may be mistaken."' So
far as competing values are concerned, most people discover that their
repertoire of values is not fully apparent to them until the moment of
decision, and even then it remains more or less disorganized. Perhaps
most important, in the real world, people usually have to answer to
others for the consequences of what they have done. Those times often
occasion recrimination that they would prefer to avoid.
As a practical matter, in these real-world circumstances the values that
we affirm as fundamental in the abstract often turn out to be incompati-
ble in concrete application. The incommensurability of values has been
tellingly expounded by Sir Isaiah Berlin in his many writings. In his
most recently published book, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, he
says:
[S]cientifically minded rationalists declared that conflict and tragedy arose
only from ignorance of fact [and] inadequacies of method ... so that, in
principle, at least... a harmonious, rationally organized society [can be]
established.... But if it is the case that not all ultimate human ends are
necessarily compatible, there may be no escape from choices governed by
no overriding principle, some of them painful, both to the agent and to
others.2
If Sir Isaiah is correct, and I submit that he is, then the real world of
ordinary people offers "no escape from choices governed by no overrid-
ing principle."' It is the ethics of such real world people that should be
compared with the ethics of a real world lawyer. This is not to suggest
that lawyers' ethical problems are entirely the same as those of ordinary
people. Nor is it to suggest that because ordinary people often fail to do
the right thing, there is no reason to expect that lawyers will do the right
1. BARTLETr'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 328 (14th ed. 1968).
2. SIR ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 234-35 (1990).
3. Id.
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thing. Rather, the point is that in both ordinary life and in the practice
of law, the problem of doing the right thing is often deeply difficult, and
sometimes anguishing.
To develop the point, I would like to consider three cases drawn from
ordinary life that parallel three classic "hard cases" in legal ethics. The
first is defending a person that the lawyer knows is guilty. Another clas-
sic hard case is pleading the statute of limitations against a person who
has a good claim. A third is interjecting the lawyer's own moral and
prudential values into advice given to a client.
In these situations, the governing rules of legal ethics are very clear.
With regard to defending a person who is guilty, if the client wishes to
defend the case, it is the lawyer's ethical duty to defend the client. This
duty holds even though the lawyer would conclude, if the matter were
left to him, that the client is indeed guilty. With respect to asserting the
defense of the statute of limitations, if the client wishes to assert the de-
fense, it is the lawyer's ethical duty to interpose the statute. This duty
holds even if the lawyer would not have asserted the defense if the claim
had been against the lawyer himself. With regard to interjection of per-
sonal, moral and prudential values, under the governing rules of profes-
sional ethics the lawyer has authority and at times the duty to be
assertive.
I propose three parallel cases drawn from ordinary life. The hypo-
thetical facts involve only slight transformations from real cases that I
have experienced. A case from ordinary life paralleling the defense of the
guilty client is that in which a parent is confronted by a neighbor who
says that his window was broken by a rock thrown by the parent's child.
A case from ordinary life paralleling the statute of limitations defense is
where one person says to another concerning an old grievance: "Can't
we just forget about that?" This type of plea is often invoked in friend-
ships, business relations and marriages. A case from ordinary life paral-
leling that of the lawyer as moral and prudential adviser is where
business or family advice is sought and received. My general thesis is
that in confronting such ethical problems in real life, ordinary people
have difficulty doing the right thing. Why should it be any easier in legal
practice?
Let us begin with the case of the parent confronted with an accusation
against her child. This case is something of a standard in discussions of
personal ethics, where the question is put: Would you lie to protect your
child? The standard alternatives in answering this question usually are
1992]
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"Yes, I would" and "No, I wouldn't." These alternatives usually are
posed as though additional circumstances are irrelevant: either one is
willing to lie or one is not. However, in real life, the decision is likely to
depend on considerations that include the historical background of the
situation and the way in which the problem is presented to the parent. I
know, believe me, for I have had several sons with better strength than
aim and was involved in similar transactions when I was a child.
Under some circumstances, a reasonable parent would support the
child in a denial, even when the parent is convinced that the child had in
fact thrown the guilty rock. Most parents would be influenced one way
or the other by such facts as the following: the child denied the accusa-
tion and was usually truthful in such statements; the child was often un-
truthful when confronted with accepting responsibility for bad acts; the
neighbor was a mean spirited complainer who also was chronically messy
with his own garbage; the neighbor was an old friend who had always
been nice to the children; the basis for the accusation was wholly circum-
stantial; the child was going through a terrible period of maladjustment
in school and would have difficulty dealing with a new crisis; there was a
racial or religious difference involved that has given an ugly subtext to
the incident; or, the parent was a minister, judge or policeman.
One could multiply the possibilities indefinitely. The point is that
among the possibilities are ones in which sustaining the child in the de-
nial would seem the right thing to do, or so it would seem to most people.
Equally, there would be circumstances where it would be the right thing
for the parent to insist that the child acknowledge responsibility, or to
accept responsibility on behalf of the child if the child adamantly refused
to do so. Putting the problem in conclusory terms, the choice would de-
pend on whether, under the circumstances, the right role for the parent
was that of protective advocate for the child as a "client," on the one
hand, or, on the other hand, that of judge of the child and mediator with
the neighbor.
Thus, we can readily visualize circumstances in which a "good per-
son" in ordinary life would defend a "client" that he believed was guilty.
Such circumstances arise not only with parent and child, but in other
relationships as well. An employer will defend an employee in a conflict
with someone outside the firm, for example, and then administer a severe
reprimand in private. Fellow employees will protect one of their number
against the boss's accusation of foul-up, but berate the misfeasor when
the boss has left. These things happen even among members of law
[Vol. 70:691
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/1
TYRRELL WILLIAMS MEMORIAL LECTURE
firms. And they happen all the time in marriage and everyday
friendship.
The special thing about lawyers is that undertaking the task of defend-
ing the guilty is part of their vocation in life. Unless such a specialization
of social function is itself evil, the fact that lawyers specialize in defend-
ing the guilty is not evil.
As we know it today, the lawyer's vocation derives from a complex
political-economic history and is a practical necessity in a modem consti-
tutional regime. Very briefly, the felt necessity for having professional
defenders of the guilty results from the fact that constitutional govern-
ment entails the rule of law; that the rule of law entails exercise of coer-
cion through legal sanctions; that legal sanctions must be administered
on the basis of unavoidably uncertain evidence and abstract, ambiguous
laws; that the task of dealing with uncertain evidence and ambiguous
laws requires special skills; and that a constitutional regime is not pre-
pared to entrust determination of guilt to judges acting as inquisitors.
That is to say, the function of an advocate has been found indispensable
to the rule of law.
Similarly, acting as a partisan advocate for a person known to be guilty
is also an unavoidable incident, although a morally troublesome one, of
the ordinary life of a "good person." Briefly again, the felt necessity for
an amateur advocate to defend the guilty, as in the case of parent for a
child, results from the fact that ordinary life is governed by general
norms such as that against throwing stones at neighbors' homes or lying
to customers; that enforcement of these norms entails exercise of coer-
cion in the form of such sanctions as disapproval, bad-mouthing and boy-
cott; that such social sanctions are administered and defended on the
basis of unavoidably uncertain facts and ambiguous norms; and that life
does not cast us in equal relationship with all of our fellow human beings.
My child is my child, whatever he or she has done. My fellow worker is
my fellow worker, and my friend is my friend.
We have to face the fact that in real life a good person, in many cir-
cumstances, would defend someone he knows to be guilty. Hence, ac-
cording to a realistic metaethic, defending the guilty is not intrinsically
wrong. Why, then, should it be wrong for a lawyer to do so?
Defending the guilty could be wrong for a lawyer only because the
lawyer takes on this unpleasant responsibility as a way of making a liv-
ing. Yet it is not clear why partisanship pursued as a vocation incident
1992]
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to a constitutional government is morally more troublesome than when it
is an incident of ordinary life.
Analysis of another classic hard case, that of pleading the statute of
limitations, proceeds along essentially similar lines. The rationale for
statutes of limitation in the law has often been expressed. A notable ex-
position is in United States v. Kubrick,4 where the United States Supreme
Court said: "These enactments are statutes of repose... affording plain-
tiffs... a reasonable time to present their claims [while protecting] de-
fendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the
search for truth may be seriously impaired.., whether by fading memo-
ries ... or otherwise."'
In a larger perspective, statutes of limitation recognize that claims that
are not promptly asserted may have dubious merit; that people, for vari-
ous reasons, forego most of their arguable legal claims in the interest of
maintaining peace and stable relationships; that claims once tacitly for-
given should not be resurrected to confound new transactions; and that
resurrection of old claims is more often a means of incrimination in a
new grievance than a means of rectification of the old one.
These same considerations apply in disputes in ordinary life. Their
relevance is brought to mind by such folk sayings as "let bygones be
bygones" and "forgive and forget." In common experience we recognize
that someone who remembers old injuries is a nuisance and that someone
who cannot forget old injuries is usually destructive and perhaps para-
noid. As Matthew Arnold stated: "We forget because we must, and not
because we will." 6
Thus, it is a recognized norm of ordinary human relationships that old
grievances should be subject to expiration. That being so, it is unclear
why the same norm is considered illegitimate when it is transformed into
law and given enforcement through lawyers.
Of course, the principle of repose as administered through a statute of
limitations often results in arbitrary distinctions. Under a statute of limi-
tations, a legal claim fully valid on one day can become totally worthless
the next day. It is also anomalous that one kind of legal claim has a life
of twenty years under the statutes of limitation and another kind of legal
claim has a life of only one year. However, the law, which acts as the
4. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
5. Id. at 117.
6. BARTLETr'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 712 (14th ed. 1968).
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ultimate norm for resolving controversy, requires a formality that is un-
necessary in ordinary social relationships. At the margin, formality inev-
itably involves technicality and technicality inevitably yields arbitrary
results. Everyone knows that there is no fundamental difference between
parking for an hour and parking for sixty-one minutes, except in the eyes
of the parking laws and the officials who enforce them. But similar
anomalies occur in everyday life. Everyone who has missed an airplane
flight knows that similarly technical chronology determines the differ-
ence, in everyday life, between making it and not making it.
My third example is that of giving advice shaped by one's own moral
and prudential values. Until recently, lawyers assumed that giving
strong advice was an important part of what they were retained to pro-
vide. As Elihu Root remarked: "About half the practice of a decent
lawyer insists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and
should stop."7
Thinking of a client as a "damned fool" is not exactly formal legal
analysis. To the contrary, it involves unashamed interjection of personal
and prudential considerations into giving legal advice. The rules of pro-
fessional ethics recognize the propriety of doing so. As stated in the
Rules of Professional Conduct concerning moral factors: "[I]t is proper
for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giv-
ing advice." The same Comment concerning prudential factors states:
"Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a cli-
ent may be disinclined to accept." 8
In recent years, however, attack has been made on the propriety of
interjecting the lawyer's own moral and prudential sense into the lawyer-
client relationship. It is charged that this puts the lawyer in a parental
role that is fraught with potential for exploitation. Implicit in the charge
is an assumption that a parental role is inconsistent with ethical princi-
ples prevailing in the community at large. The community at large sup-
posedly is committed to a kind of ethical democracy in which interjection
of the adviser's moral self is inconsistent with the self-hood and moral
autonomy of the person to whom advice is given.
Again, I submit that this ignores experience and practice in everyday
life. Most obviously, advice of a parental kind is ubiquitously given by
parents themselves. Such advice is often overtly rejected but, if given in
7. 1 PHILLIP JESSE, ELIHU RoOT 133 (1938).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 cmt. (1983).
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sincere concern for the child, is rarely ignored. In reflecting on this fact,
Mark Twain observed how much his parents had learned between the
time he was sixteen years of age and when he became nineteen. Practice
in advice-giving at the workplace is the same. How many of us have
benefitted from knowing explanations of the lay of the land given by
older hands on the job-and have suffered from ignoring such advice?
Indeed, providing such quasi-parental advice is the essence of "mentor-
ing," which young aspirants in the world of work have come to appreci-
ate as essential in making one's way. And what married person has not
had spousal advice of a similar kind in moments of confusion or distress?
More fundamentally, the notion that advice can be given unshaped by
the adviser's own ethical values is absurd in fact and pernicious in conse-
quences. It is absurd in fact because it is impossible to give purely tech-
nical advice; it is pernicious in consequences because it requires the very
alienation that the notion of democratic ethics seeks to avoid. When
someone undertakes to give advice, whether as a lawyer or in ordinary
life, it is an act of commitment and affiliation, for better or for worse.
What the advice should be in specific circumstances is another question.
Anyone who has been engaged as a parent, mentor or spouse knows that
the appropriate response is often unclear.
Many other examples beyond these could illustrate the parallel be-
tween ethical dilemmas in legal practice and ethical dilemmas in ordi-
nary life. I ask acceptance for the proposition that other examples would
reinforce the basic point: the ethical dilemmas regularly encountered in
legal practice are simply counterparts of similar dilemmas encountered in
ordinary life. People who think otherwise are, in my opinion, taking a
rose-colored view of ethics in ordinary life.
The only qualification of this proposition is the fact that lawyers in-
volve themselves in these ethical dilemmas as a vocation, while others do
so as an unavoidable incident of ordinary life. However, it is difficult to
see how this point has much force once the conditions of modern life are
accepted. A fact of modern life is the specialization of skill and function.
The beneficial consequences of such specialization are that functions
such as health care, the management of enterprises, the teaching of arts
and science, and the administration of justice are performed by people
who have special knowledge. A less happy consequence of the specializa-
tion of skills and functions is that some vocations incur more opprobrium
than others. This is certainly true of law practice, which is why, as
Sandburg cruelly observed, the "hearse horse snicker[s] hauling a lawyer
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away."9
I submit that the opprobrium is essentially what the psychiatrists call
"projection." Everyone who takes time to work through the problem of
constitutional government reaches the conclusion that defending the
guilty is simply a price of maintaining the benefits of a constitutional
order. Everyone who takes time to work through the problem of statutes
of limitation reaches the conclusion that refusing to examine the merits
of many grievances is necessary to maintaining the capacity to examine
the merits of some of them. Everyone who has given advice knows the
difficulties involved in putting one's heart into another person's affairs.
The work of lawyers simply embodies these paradoxes and the frustra-
tion of idealism that they reflect. The lawyer's vocation is living testi-
mony to the discrepancy between the community's ethical aspirations
and its merely human condition. It may also be that the availability of
lawyers to deal with some of these discrepancies permits other members
of the community to imagine themselves above such unpleasantness and
allows them to live in an imaginary world.
Defending the guilty, pleading the statute of limitations, and giving
hard advice, are often the right things to do, even if they involve conflicts
in values. Trying to do the right thing, when it is impossible to do so
without conflicts in values, is one of society's dirty jobs. However, no
one is compelled to become a lawyer, and many who have originally cho-
sen the profession find it repugnant and leave. Many people in ordinary
life go about confronting adulthood in the same way.
9. CARL SANDBURG, The Lawyers Know Too Much, in SELECTED POEMS OF CARL
SANDBURG 199 (R. West ed., 1954).
Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does a hearse horse snicker
hauling a lawyer away?
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